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ARGUMENT 
1. Both the Employment Agreement and the Notice of Termination 
Are Effective 15 Days from Delivery. 
Appellee's argument accurately reflects that the sole question before 
this Court concerns the date upon which the employment was breached. If 
the employment contract was breached on December 24, 1997 when the 
Notice of Termination became effective, then Appellant's lawsuit is timely 
and this Court should set aside the Order granting Appellee's Motion to 
Dismiss and allow this matter to continue to trial. If the employment 
contract was breached on December 9, 1997 when the Notice of Termination 
was presented to Appellant, then the statute of limitations bars recovery by 
Appellant. 
Appellee argues strenuously that the breach took place on the date the 
Notice of Termination was presented to Appellant, stating that the breach 
was final, definite and sure on such date. However, Appellee fails to 
consider the plain language of the Notice of the Termination which clearly 
states: 
This letter is your written notice that we are 
terminating the Independent Salesman Agreement that 
we have with you effective 15 days from the above date 
[December 9, 1997] Please prepare and submit to us a 
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list of all pending unfinished business involving sales of 
Company products. 
This action is taken per section IU oi uie 
Independent Salesman Agreement you signed on 
1997. [emphasis added] 
The above Notice comports with the Independent Salesman 
Agreement which requires that Appellee give an employee 15 days advance 
n^fi,Ni N^tsiv - * • it.
 s iu o. 
That the Notice of Termination was not effective on the date that it 
wu> pie>ui:i .; . vppellaru . J> ana apparent t n:>i. appellee was not 
terminating Appellai IVtvinKi-') I W i lit • * K*t. iMr'-.-^ > rtho 
Notice, but by its very terms, was effecting the termination in 15 days. 
Thus, no breach occurs until December 24, 1997 when the termination of 
einpK'Xcc .sci!ij;...; .. .*as cnecme and una]. 
Second, Appellee had unfinished business for Appellant to complete 
before he left the emplo\ wi Appellee. Appellant was requested, or required 
involving sales of Appellee's products. Simpl)r put, Appellant was required 
to finish up his business during the 15 day period of time. By the very 
terms of tl: le Notice, Appellant was required to compile data, assemble 
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report of all pending, unfinished business. If Appellant was terminated on 
the date of the presentation of the Notice, then Appellee could not have 
demanded, required and expected Appellant to undertake the arduous task of 
resolving the unfinished matters. However, Appellee, by the very terms of 
its demands upon Appellant, did not believe the employment contract to be 
terminated until December 24, 1997 and thus, it made the above strenuous 
demands upon Appellant, still considering him to be an employee and 
servant in the master-servant relationship (required to jump when ordered 
and to heed when beckoned). 
2. Reference to Appellee's Trial Court Memorandums to Support 
Statements of Facts Should Be Stricken: While it is accepted law that for 
purposes of Motions to Dismiss and their following appeals that factual 
statements in complaints are assumed to be truthful, the same presumption 
does not apply to Memoranda filed with respect to motions filed with the 
trial court. 
Thus, Appellees statements set forth in it's brief referring to factual 
statements made in memoranda submitted to the trial court should not be 
allowed to stand and should not be considered by this Court. 
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2. Appellee Misquotes Appellant's Statements: On page 12 of 
Appellee's brief, last paragraph, line 3, Appellee states: 
At that time, Clarke was "rather unceremoniously 
informed that Living no longer desires to associate with 
him." 
Appellee places a period at the end of the above quotation, as if the 
above statement stands on its own. However, the above statement actually 
states: 
Clarke was given the notice of termination, instructed to 
clean out his desk and marched out the front door of the 
business, but was rather unceremoniously informed that 
Living no longer desired to associate with him and that as 
of 15 days from the date of the letter, or December 25, 
1997, he was not to consider himself a part of the Living 
family of employees. ( Attorney's Note: it appears that 
the 25th date was an error and should have been the 24th. 
Whether the actual date is the 24th or the 25th makes no 
difference in the outcome of the case or this appeal) 
If Appellee is to cite facts from a memorandum in support of its 
position, it is only appropriate that the entire statement be referred to and not 
just to a portion which is made to appear as a complete statement. The 
above statement, as set, forth clearly illustrates that Appellant was given the 
Notice of Termination, was told to leave the premises, but was under a 
continuing obligation of servitude to Living as a part of the Living family of 
employees up and until December 24, 1997. His discontinuance of 
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association was not effective until December 24, 1997. He had work to do. 
He had duties to fulfill and he continued to be a part of the family of 
employees through December 24, 1997. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee correctly discerns that the issue for resolution centers on the 
event upon which the breach occurred. Appellee cites a number of cases, 
most concerning employment discrimination rather than breach of an 
employment contract. Those cases indicate that breach of the contract takes 
place upon the date of the breach. But when is the breach? The breach in 
this case took place not on the date of delivery of the notice of termination, 
but rather it was "effective" 15 days from the date of delivery. 
In addition, Appellant was required to finish up his pending business 
and prepare and submit reports to Appellee as part of his final duties as an 
employee. For 15 days after the delivery of the Notice, Appellant continued 
to be an employee, continued to report on the progress of his work, 
continued to answer to a superior and continued under the aegis and 
direction of Living. 
Thus, there was no breach until the end of the 15 days and no cause of 
action arose or accrued until the 15 days elapsed. 
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Appellant prays that the lower court's Order of Dismissal be set aside 
and that the matter be allowed to continue to trial on the merits. 
Dated this (_ day of December, 2004. 
ROBERT D. ROSE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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on the f day of December, 2004. 
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